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‘‘Near-miss’’ events, where unsuccessful outcomes
are proximal to the jackpot, increase gambling
propensity and may be associated with the addic-
tiveness of gambling, but little is known about the
neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie their
potency. Using a simplified slot machine task, we
measured behavioral and neural responses to
gambling outcomes. Compared to ‘‘full-misses,’’
near-misses were experienced as less pleasant, but
increased desire to play. This effect was restricted
to trials where the subject had personal control
over arranging their gamble. Near-miss outcomes
recruited striatal and insula circuitry that also re-
sponded to monetary wins; in addition, near-miss-
related activity in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex
varied as a function of personal control. Insula
activity to near-misses correlated with self-report
ratings as well as a questionnaire measure of
gambling propensity. These data indicate that near-
misses invigorate gambling through the anomalous
recruitment of reward circuitry, despite the objective
lack of monetary reinforcement on these trials.
INTRODUCTION
Gambling is a prevalent and culturally ubiquitous form of enter-
tainment that becomes dysfunctional in a small but significant
minority (1%–5%), in whom it resembles a substance addiction
in several core respects (Potenza, 2006; Shaffer et al., 2004).
The popularity of gambling might seem surprising given the
widespread acceptance among those who gamble that ‘‘the
house always wins.’’ This refers to the notion that the expected
value of gambling is negative, such that the player will lose
money over time. In order to identify the etiological processes
in problem (or ‘‘pathological’’) gambling, it is necessary to under-
stand the allure of gambling within wider society. Cognitive
formulations of gambling (e.g., Langer, 1975; Wagenaar, 1988;
Walker, 1992) propose that certain characteristics of gambling
games foster an exaggerated confidence in one’s chances of
winning. Thus, even though the winning outcomes are deter-
mined largely or purely by chance, the gambler develops an‘‘illusion of control’’ such that he believes he can master the
game and recoup his past losses.
In this study, we focus on two common characteristics of
gambling games that can be modeled in the laboratory and are
known to promote gambling tendencies: the impact of near-
misses and the influence of personal control. Near-misses occur
when an unsuccessful outcome is proximal to the designated
win, such as when a chosen horse finishes in second place or
when two cherries are displayed on the slot machine payline.
Their significance to the gambler has long been recognized
(e.g., Reid, 1986), to the extent that the misappropriation of slot
machine near-misses has been the focus of legal cases (Harri-
gan, 2008). Studies manipulating the frequency of near-misses
have shown effects on gambling persistence (Cote et al., 2003;
Kassinove andSchare, 2001), which follow an inverted-U shaped
function that is maximal around 30% (Kassinove and Schare,
2001). As a consequence of near-misses, the gambler may feel
that he is ‘‘not constantly losing but constantly nearly winning’’
(Griffiths, 1991). These accounts of near-misses emphasize their
positive, hedonic value, such that we predicted recruitment of
brain reward circuitry during near-miss outcomes, despite the
objective lack of monetary reinforcement on these trials.
The second factor that was modeled in our task was personal
control, which refers to the gambler’s level of involvement in ar-
ranging their gamble. On games of pure chance like the lottery,
craps, and roulette, gamblers have an equal chance of winning
regardless of whether they, or another agent, places the gamble.
However, it is repeatedly observed that gamblers have inflated
confidence (indicated by wager size, for example) when given
the opportunity to choose their lottery ticket or throw the dice
or roulette ball themselves, compared to conditions where the
action is performed by another (Davis et al., 2000; Ladouceur
and Mayrand, 1987; Langer, 1975). Craps players also use
harder throws when trying to roll high numbers (Henslin, 1967).
The presence of personal control may be a core factor in causing
the gambler to mistake a game of chance for a game with some
skill component, which is effectively controllable. Instrumentality
(i.e., the requirement of an active response) has been shown to
influence the neural correlates of feedback processing in recent
brain imaging (O’Doherty et al., 2004; Tricomi et al., 2004;Walton
et al., 2004) and electroencephalography (Yeung et al., 2005)
studies with monetary reward tasks. We reasoned that if near-
miss outcomes promoted gambling behavior by fostering an illu-
sion of control, their efficacy would be greater on trials where the
gambler had personal control, compared to trials where the
gamble was arranged by the computer.Neuron 61, 481–490, February 12, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 481
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Brain Responses to Gambling Near-MissesThe aims of the present study were threefold: first, to devise
a task to elicit near-miss and control phenomena in the labora-
tory, as measured by self-report ratings administered on
a trial-by-trial basis. Second, we explored the neural mecha-
nisms underlying these cognitive distortions, using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We were specifically
interested in a neural system comprising the ventral striatum
and medial frontal cortex, which previous research has
robustly implicated in processing unexpected monetary wins
(Breiter et al., 2001; Delgado et al., 2000; Elliott et al., 2000; Knut-
son et al., 2003), as well as primary rewards (e.g., fruit juice)
(Berns et al., 2001; McClure et al., 2003), social rewards (acqui-
sition of good reputation; Izuma et al., 2008), and drugs of abuse
(Breiter et al., 1997; Gilman et al., 2008; Stein et al., 1998). Third,
we examined the associations between the level of activation in
this circuitry during gambling and a trait measure of gambling
propensity, the gambling-related cognitions scale (GRCS; Raylu
and Oei, 2004). This self-report questionnaire assesses the
susceptibility to common gambling distortions like predictive
control (the belief that one can predict when a win is due) and
interpretive bias (reframing gambling outcomes to encourage
further play; see Table S1 available online). In contrast to clini-
cally oriented gambling scales such as the South Oaks Gambling
Screen (SOGS; Lesieur and Blume, 1987), GRCS scores are
well-distributed within samples of non-problem gamblers (Raylu
and Oei, 2004).
We developed a gambling task (see Figure 1) resembling a slot
machine with two reels, each displaying six icons and a payline.
On each trial, the participant could either win (£0.50) or not win.
Personal control was manipulated by having the participant
choose the play icon on some trials, and the computer chose
the play icon on other trials. Following selection of the play
icon on the left reel, the right reel was spun for an anticipatory
period and slowed to a standstill on one icon. Wins occurred
on 1/6 of trials, when the right reel stopped with the play icon
in the payline. Near-misses occurred on 2/6 of trials, when the
play icon stopped one position from the payline. These frequen-
cies are comparable to real-world slot machines (Griffiths, 1993),
and previous work has shown optimal gambling persistence at
a 30% frequency of near-misses compared to 15% and 45%
frequencies (Kassinove and Schare, 2001). All other outcomes
(3/6 of trials) where the play icon stoppedmore than one position
from the payline were designated ‘‘full-misses.’’
RESULTS
Experiment I: Behavioral Effects of Near-Misses
and Personal Control
In a behavioral experiment in healthy volunteers (n = 40), three
sets of self-report ratings were taken on each trial. Immediately
after the selection phase, participants were asked ‘‘How do
you rate your chances of winning?’’ After the outcome phase,
two further ratings were taken: ‘‘How pleased are you with the
result?’’ and ‘‘How much do you want to continue to play the
game?’’ Each subjects’ ratings were z transformed to their own
mean and standard deviation for statistical analysis. Personal
control over the gamble was associated with significantly higher
ratings of ‘‘chances of winning,’’ compared to trials where the482 Neuron 61, 481–490, February 12, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.computer selected the play icon (t39 = 5.09, p < 0.001; see
Figure 2 and Table S2). The personal control manipulation also
affected the hedonic response to winning outcomes: ‘‘pleased
with result’’ ratings were significantly higher on participant-
chosen wins compared to computer-chosen wins (t39 = 2.50,
p = 0.017; see Table S2).
The subjective response to the near-miss outcomes was
striking: near-misses were experienced as aversive according
to the ratings of ‘‘pleased with result,’’ but simultaneously
increased ratings of ‘‘continue to play.’’ Both effects varied as
a function of personal control (‘‘pleased with result’’ control 3
outcome interaction F2,78 = 12.3, p = 0.001; ‘‘continue to play’’
control3 outcome interaction F2,78 = 6.50, p = 0.002). Compared
to computer-chosen near-misses, participant-chosen near-
misses were significantly less pleasant (t39 = 4.21, p < 0.001)
but significantly more motivating (t39 = 4.69, p < 0.001).
Compared to participant-chosen full-misses, participant-
chosen near-misses were significantly less pleasant (t39 =
2.75, p = 0.009) and significantly more motivating (t39 = 2.66,
p = 0.011; see Figure 2). Further post hoc analysis revealed
that the effect of the near-misses to increase ratings of ‘‘continue
to play’’ on participant-chosen trials was predominantly driven
Figure 1. Screen Display for the Slot Machine Task
The slot machine task displayed two reels, a payline and a box displaying
current earnings. Both reels displayed the same six icons. Each trial
commenced with a selection phase (duration 5 s), where either the participant
or the computer selected the ‘‘play icon’’ on the left-hand reel. The right-hand
reel then spun for a variable anticipation phase (duration 2.8–6 s), decelerating
to a standstill. In the outcome phase (duration 4 s), if the play icon on the right-
hand reel stopped in the payline (i.e., was aligned with the chosen play icon on
the left-hand reel), the participant won £0.50. Other outcomes yielded nowin; it
was not possible for the participant to lose money. Trials where the right-hand
reel reached a standstill one position from the payline (either above or below)
were classified as near-misses, and trials where the right-hand reel stopped
more than one position from the payline were classified as full-misses. During
the selection phase, participants performed a pseudorandom sequence of
participant-chosen (white background) and computer-chosen (black back-
ground) trials. On participant-chosen trials, the subject was able to rotate
the left-hand reel and select a play icon by moving it around to the payline.
On computer-chosen trials, the computer would rotate the left-hand reel until
one play icon was highlighted on the payline; the subject was required to
confirm selection with a button press to ensure adequate attention.
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Brain Responses to Gambling Near-Missesby trials where, during reel spinning, the play iconmoved through
the payline and stopped in the next position (mean z = +0.18),
compared to near-misses where the chosen icon stopped
one position short of the payline (mean z = 0.19; t39 = 3.90,
p < 0.001).
Experiment II: Neural Correlates of the Slot
Machine Task
Brain responses during gambling play were measured using
fMRI in a second group of 15 volunteers. Subjects played
a longer version of the task comprising 3 blocks of 60 trials,
yielding a total of 30 wins (£15), and subjective ratings were
only taken intermittently (on 1 in 3 trials). An event-related anal-
ysis was used to identify neural responses at the receipt of the
outcome, with the selection and anticipation phases entered
as covariates in the design matrix (see Supplemental Data).
The contrast of winning outcomes against all nonwin outcomes
yielded significant signal change (p < 0.05 after correction for
family wise error rate) in a distributed circuit comprising the
ventral striatum bilaterally, the anterior insula bilaterally, the
rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC), the thalamus and
a midbrain cluster in proximity to the dopaminergic cells in the
substantia nigra/ventral tegmental area (Bunzeck and Duzel,
2006; D’Ardenne et al., 2008; see Figure 3A and Table S4).
This circuit is reliably activated in previous imaging studies using
both unconditioned and conditioned reinforcers (Berns et al.,
2001; Breiter et al., 2001; Delgado et al., 2000; Elliott et al.,
2000; Knutson et al., 2003; McClure et al., 2003). The win-related
Figure 2. Subjective Ratings on the Slot
Machine Task
Ratings for each subject were standardized based
on the individual’s mean and standard deviation
for that rating, given the variability in anchoring
across subjects.
(A) Ratings of ‘‘How do you rate your chances of
winning?’’ were significantly higher on partici-
pant-chosen trials compared to computer-chosen
trials (t39 = 5.09, p < 0.001).
(B) Ratings of ‘‘Howmuch do you want to continue
to play the game?’’ on near-miss and full-miss
outcomes. The ‘‘near-miss effect’’ (increased
desire to play after near-misses) was restricted
to trials where the subject had personal control
over the gamble; near-misses selected by the
computer significantly reduced desire to play.
Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
Figure 3. Neural Activity to Winning and Near-Miss Outcomes
(A) Neural responses to monetary wins compared to all non-wins, modeled to the onset of the outcome phase. Suprathreshold voxels (p < 0.05 corrected for
multiple comparisons) are displayed across 5 axial sections on the ch2bet template, using MRIcron software (http://www.sph.sc.edu/comd/rorden/mricron/).
There was significant win-related activity in the ventral putamen (left: 14 10 2; right 16 4 12), anterior insula (left: 36 18 4; right 28 16 10), midbrain
(6 20 14) and rostral anterior cingulate cortex (4 32 6) (see Table S3).
(B) Neural responses to near-miss outcomes compared to full-miss outcomes, using a mask of win-related activity (mask thresholded at pFWE-corr < 0.05). The
contrast map has been thresholded at the lower level of p < 0.001 uncorrected to illustrate the anatomical extent of the clusters. Near-misses were associated
with significant activity (pFWE-corr < 0.05) in the bilateral ventral putamen (left: 8 4 2; right 12 2 2) and right anterior insula (32 18 0).Neuron 61, 481–490, February 12, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 483
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Brain Responses to Gambling Near-MissesFigure 4. Near Miss by Control Interaction
in Rostral ACC
(A) The interactive effect of near-misses and
personal control was associated with signal
change in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex
(rACC, Brodmann Area 24). The contrast image
shown was restricted to near-miss outcomes
that passed through the payline, compared to
full-misses, using a mask of win-related activity
(mask thresholded at pFWE-corr < 0.05). For display
purposes, the contrast map is thresholded at
p < 0.001 uncorrected.
(B) Extracted signal change from this cluster (aver-
aged across all suprathreshold voxels using Mars-
bar) reveals that rACC activity was greater for
near-misses (compared to full-misses) on partici-
pant-chosen trials (p = 0.005) but was lower for
near-misses (compared to full-misses) on
computer-chosen trials (p = 0.058).
Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.circuit was implemented as a mask for the further fMRI contrasts
that were orthogonal to this comparison.
The contrast comparing the near-miss outcomes against the
full-miss outcomes showed significantly elevated signal change
to near-misses in the ventral striatum bilaterally (x, y, z = 8, 4,
2, Z = 4.30, pFWE-corr = 0.005; 12, 2, 2, Z = 4.25, pFWE-corr =
0.006) and the right anterior insula (x, y, z = 32, 18, 0, Z = 3.63,
pFWE-corr = 0.049), despite the lack of objective monetary gain
on those trials (see Figure 3B). Signal increases in the ventral
striatum and anterior insula to near-miss outcomes were present
on trials with, and without, personal control. A third contrast
assessed the interaction of the near-miss effect (near-misses
minus full-misses) and personal control (participant-chosen
trials minus computer-chosen trials) and identified bilateral vox-
els in the rACC region (Brodmann Area 24) with significance
levels just below the familywise error-corrected threshold (x, y,
z = 4, 32, 2, Z = 3.48, pFWE-corr = 0.062; x, y, z = 4, 38, 2, Z =
3.36, pFWE-corr = 0.088). When this contrast was confined to
near-misses that had passed through the payline and stopped
in the next position (given that the behavioral impact of near-
misses was predominantly driven by this type), these voxels in
the rACC were fully significant despite the restricted number of
events (x, y, z = 4, 38, 2, Z = 4.34, pFWE-corr = 0.005; x, y, z =
4, 34, 2, Z = 3.97, pFWE-corr = 0.019; x, y, z = 6, 38, 2; z = 3.67,
pFWE-corr = 0.049). An analysis of extracted signal change from
these voxels showed greater activity on near-misses compared
to full-misses on participant-chosen trials (t14 = 3.37, p = 0.005),
with a marginally significant effect in the opposite direction on
computer-chosen trials (t14 = 2.06, p = 0.058; see Figure 4).
Neural responses to the win and near-miss related contrasts
were regressed against two sets of variables. First, we looked
for brain areas where neural responses to wins and near-misses
were correlated with the GRCS questionnaire, which assesses
the susceptibility to cognitive distortions associated with
gambling. GRCS total scores were well-distributed within the
group (see Table S1). There were no significant voxels within
the win-related circuit when GRCS score was regressed against
win activity (wins minus all nonwins). However, when GRCS
score was regressed onto near-miss activity (near-misses minus484 Neuron 61, 481–490, February 12, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.full-misses), there was a significant cluster in the anterior insula/
caudolateral orbitofrontal cortex (BA 47; x, y, z = 42, 18, 10;
z = 3.98, pFWE-corr = 0.018; see Figure 5A). This correlation indi-
cates that subjects who rated themselves as more susceptible
to gambling distortions showed greater recruitment of the ante-
rior insula in response to near-miss outcomes.
Second, we looked for brain areas where neural responses to
wins and near-misses were correlated with the subjective ratings
of ‘‘continue to play.’’ As ratings were acquired on one in three
trials, we calculated a mean win effect for each subject (ratings
on available win outcomes minus ratings on available nonwin
outcomes) and a mean near-miss effect for each subject (ratings
on available near-miss outcomes minus ratings on available
full-miss outcomes). There were no significant voxels within the
win mask when the subjective win effect was regressed against
win-related brain activity. When the subjective near-miss effect
was regressed against near-miss related brain activity, adjacent
voxels in the anterior insula (Brodmann Area 13) and caudolat-
eral orbitofrontal cortex (Brodmann Area 47) were the only sig-
nificant effects at a reduced threshold of p < 0.001 uncorrected
for multiple comparisons (x, y, z = 30, 16, 10, Z = 3.24, punc =
0.001; x, y, z = 34, 24, 4, Z = 3.37, punc < 0.0001). This correla-
tion indicates that subjects who reported greater subjective
effects of the near-misses on their ratings of ‘‘continue to
play’’ showed a greater BOLD response to near-miss outcomes
in the anterior insula/caudolateral orbitofrontal cortex (see
Figure 5B).
DISCUSSION
The main focus of this study was the comparison of two types of
nonwin outcome: near-misses, where the slot machine reel
stopped one position from the chosen icon, and full-misses,
where the outcome was not proximal to a win. While the objec-
tive outcome on these two trial types was the same (i.e., zero
gain), there were significant differences between the patterns
of neural response to the near-misses and full-misses. Near-
misses were associated with significantly greater BOLD signal
in the ventral striatum and anterior insula; areas that were also
Neuron
Brain Responses to Gambling Near-Missesactivated by unpredictable monetary wins on the task. This win
contrast detected additional responses in the rACC, midbrain,
and thalamus, confirming a well-established circuit of areas
linked to reinforcement processing (Berns et al., 2001; Breiter
et al., 2001; Elliott et al., 2000; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005b; Thut
et al., 1997), often referred to as the mesolimbic reward system
(Elliott et al., 2000; Reuter et al., 2005). We propose that the
recruitment of win-related regions during near-miss outcomes
underlies their ability to promote gambling behavior. Previous
studies have reported that moderate frequencies of near-misses
(30%) encourage gambling persistence on slot machine simu-
lations (Cote et al., 2003; Kassinove and Schare, 2001). By
measuring the subjective response to outcomes on the slot
machine task, we were able to better characterize these near-
miss experiences. Although near-misses were rated as more
unpleasant than full-misses, they simultaneously increased the
desire to play the game. This invigorating effect depended
upon a second factor, of personal control: near-misses only
increased the desire to play when the subject had direct control
over arranging their gamble. The interaction between near-
misses and personal control was also evident in the fMRI data.
In the rostral portion of the ACC, anterior to the genu of the
corpus callosum, participant-chosen near-misses were associ-
ated with significantly greater BOLD signal than participant-
chosen full-misses, whereas the opposite effect was observed
Figure 5. Insula Activation to Near-Misses
Correlated with Trait Gambling Propensity
and the Subjective Effect of Near-Misses
(A) A trait measure of the susceptibility to gambling
biases (the gambling-related cognitions scale;
GRCS) predicted near-miss-related neural activity
(contrast of near-misses minus full-misses) in the
anterior insula/caudolateral orbitofrontal cortex
(Brodmann Area 47). An SPM5 regression of
near-miss-related activity onto GRCS total score,
using a mask of win-related activity, revealed
a single significant cluster in the left anterior insula
(x, y, z =42, 18,10, z = 3.98, pFWE-corr = 0.018),
with extracted signal change displayed on the
right hand side. For display purposes, the regres-
sion map is thresholded at p < 0.005 uncorrected.
(B) Near-miss related activity in the anterior insula
(Brodmann Area 13) was also significantly corre-
lated with the subjective effects of near-miss
outcomes on a rating of ‘‘How much do you want
to continue to play the game?’’ The SPM5 regres-
sion map reveals a cluster in the right anterior in-
sula (x, y, z = 30, 16, 10, z = 3.24, punc =
0.001), with extracted signal change displayed
on the right hand side. For display purposes,
the regression map is thresholded at p < 0.005
uncorrected.
oncomputer-chosen trials, albeit at a level
that was not statistically reliable.
The anterior insula was recruited during
both monetary wins and near-miss
outcomes, and in addition, the BOLD
response to near-misses in this region
was associated with two sets of psychological variables. There
was a significant positive correlation between insula activity to
near-misses and the GRCS, a questionnaire measure of the
susceptibility to gambling biases. We also observed a significant
positive correlation between insula activity to near-misses and
the subjective ratings of the near-misses on ‘‘How much do
you want to continue to play the game?’’ In each case, the insula
was the only area in the win-related circuit to show these predic-
tive relationships. Thus, the neural response to near-miss
outcomes in the anterior insula was associated with both the
subjective impact of those events during scanning and a trait-
related index of gambling propensity that is significantly elevated
in problem gamblers (Raylu and Oei, 2004). While the significant
insula foci were differentially lateralized (GRCS, left insula;
subjective ratings, right insula), contralateral foci were apparent
in both regressions when the statistical threshold was lowered
(data not shown), and therefore we do not infer any meaningful
lateralization from these results. These correlations lend support
to the ecological validity of our task. Moreover, they suggest that
the anterior insula may be a key locus in mediating the invigo-
rating effects of near-miss outcomes on gambling behavior.
Our insula data are congruent with accumulating evidence for
insula involvement in drug craving and extend these findings to
gambling as a behavior that can become addictive (Potenza,
2006). Functional imaging studies in cocaine addicts haveNeuron 61, 481–490, February 12, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 485
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cocaine-related stimuli (Garavan et al., 2000; Wang et al.,
1999), which was correlated with subjective reports of the
degree of induced craving (Wang et al., 1999). A neuropsycho-
logical study has reported that patients with insula damage
showed rapid cessation of cigarette smoking without persistent
urges to smoke, compared to brain-injured patients with
damage to other regions (Naqvi et al., 2007). A study in experi-
mental animals also showed that temporary inactivation of the
insula reduced amphetamine seeking behavior in amphet-
amine-experienced rats (Contreras et al., 2007). Given its well-
recognized role in the processing of bodily feedback (Craig,
2002), the insula’s involvement in addictive behaviors may be
to signal the interoceptive aspects of compulsive urges (Gray
and Critchley, 2007). While previous fMRI studies have often
associated insula activity with negative emotional states like
disgust (Phillips et al., 1997), pain (Ploghaus et al., 1999), or
risk of financial loss (Paulus et al., 2003), it is also reliably
recruited in response to monetary gains (Delgado et al., 2000;
Elliott et al., 2000; Izuma et al., 2008) and other appetitive pro-
cessing (Craig, 2002). Based on the present findings, we would
hypothesize that excessive insula recruitment during gambling
play may be a risk factor for the cognitive distortions and loss-
chasing that are characteristic of problem (‘‘compulsive’’)
gambling.
These findings provide a number of further insights into the
psychological basis of the near-miss effect. By one account,
the near-miss may be conceptualized as the omission of an ex-
pected reward and considered within the context of fMRI studies
of reinforcement learning by prediction error (e.g., D’Ardenne
et al., 2008; McClure et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003). By
this formulation, on near-miss trials, as the slot machine reel
approaches a standstill during the anticipation phase, the
subject develops an expectation that they are about to win.
Thismay be analogous to an effect shown in electrophysiological
research, that during appetitive Pavlovian conditioning tasks
with uncertain rewards, there is a ‘‘ramping up’’ of mesolimbic
dopamine cell firing between the CS presentation and the
expected time of juice delivery (Fiorillo et al., 2003). In our slot
machine task, this positive prediction error is rapidly followed
by a negative prediction error in the outcome phase, as the ex-
pected win is withheld. Dopamine cells show a pause in firing
to omission of an expected reward (Schultz, 2006). The observed
signal in the ventral striatum during near-miss outcomes is
compatible with this account, as BOLD response in this region
is known to correlate closely with both positive and negative
prediction errors (D’Ardenne et al., 2008; McClure et al., 2003;
O’Doherty et al., 2003) and is observed irrespective of instru-
mental demands (O’Doherty et al., 2004; Zink et al., 2003),
consistent with our finding that this region responded to near-
misses across both participant-chosen and computer-chosen
conditions. However, several aspects of this formulation remain
unclear: how positive and negative prediction errors may
summate when occurring close together in time, how pauses
in dopamine cell firing influence the BOLD response, and
whether reward omission and discrete ‘‘nonwin’’ events are anal-
ogous. Future research may fruitfully manipulate the expectation
of winning in order to study its effect upon near-miss processing.486 Neuron 61, 481–490, February 12, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.Several aspects of the current data present problems for an
account of the near-miss effect solely in terms of reward expec-
tation and omission. First, why should unpleasant reward omis-
sion invigorate behavior? It is unclear how this account would
explain our finding that near-misses increased self-report ratings
of desire to play the game. In many real-world situations (e.g.,
target practice), near-miss outcomes are indicative of skill acqui-
sition and, as such, constitute useful signals of imminent
success. In these environments, it is advantageous for reinforce-
ment learning algorithms to compute a value function that can
assign some value to near-misses, despite the objective
absence of reinforcement on these trials (e.g., Daw et al.,
2006; Kakade and Dayan, 2002). In many gambling games,
however, winning outcomes are chance events and near-misses
are not predictive of winning, and so it would be misleading to
assign value to near-misses. Humans are often deficient at pro-
cessing chance events (Carlson and Shu, 2007; Wagenaar,
1988), and it is conceivable that gambling games may harness
a reinforcement learning system that evolved to handle skill-
oriented behaviors.
A second issue is that the reward expectation and omission
components were matched across the participant-chosen and
computer-chosen conditions, but we saw differences between
the near-miss outcomes as a function of personal control, in
both the subjective ratings and the rACC response. These
effects are more consistent with cognitive formulations of
gambling that invoke an ‘‘illusion of control,’’ where the gambler
interprets the near-miss as evidence that he has acquired skill at
the game. Crucially, this appraisal of skill is most likely to occur
when the player has control over their gamble selection. Thus,
by interpreting the near-miss event as evidence of skill acquisi-
tion, the subject is motivated to continue gambling in order to
exploit this (perceived) knowledge. Our finding that the rACC is
sensitive to this manipulation is consistent with much that is
known about ACC involvement in reward processing and deci-
sion-making. Lesion studies in experimental animals have shown
a critical role for ACC in deciding howmuch effort to invest in ob-
taining a reward (Rudebeck et al., 2006) and in using the
outcomes of past decisions to guide ongoing choice (Behrens
et al., 2007; Kennerley et al., 2006). The dependency of the
rACC response upon personal control is also consistent with
event-related potential data where the feedback negativity
(thought to derive from a medial frontal source) was enhanced
on trials where a choice or response was required (Yeung
et al., 2005; see also Walton et al., 2004 for similar data using
fMRI). In the specific context of gambling behavior, we postulate
that the rACC plays a key role in processing the personal signif-
icance of the near-miss outcomes; that is, interpreting them as
evidence of skill acquisition and using these outcomes to inform
subsequent choice.
An alternative, lower-level account of these near-miss
phenomena is that they are an effect of perceptual generaliza-
tion. By virtue of their spatial proximity to the goal state, near-
misses may engender some goal-related neural processing.
Such an account seems unlikely for two reasons. First, spatial
proximity to the payline is equally present across the partici-
pant-chosen and computer-chosen conditions, but the impact
of the near-misses on ratings of ‘‘continue to play’’ and rACC
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Brain Responses to Gambling Near-Missessignal diverged as a function of personal control. Second, both
the subjective ratings and the rACC signal were predominantly
modulated by near-misses that passed through the payline
before stopping; the near-misses that stopped one position
short of the payline were much less effective. A perceptual
generalization account would predict comparable effects for
near-misses either side of the payline.
The effects of near-misses and personal control in the present
study were observed in healthy volunteers who did not gamble
regularly. When nine subjects with moderate gambling involve-
ment (South Oaks Gambling Screen scores 2–5) were excluded
from the behavioral analysis (n = 31), the potency of the near-
miss and personal control manipulations were unaffected (see
Supplemental Data). However, as gambling becomes dysfunc-
tional and problematic, it is likely that these cognitive distortions
become exacerbated (Joukhador et al., 2003), along with disrup-
tion of multiple components of reward-related brain circuitry. A
previous fMRI study in pathological gamblers using a card-
guessing task reported blunted activation in the ventral striatum
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (which includes the rACC) in
a contrast of monetary wins and losses (Reuter et al., 2005).
Similar findings were reported in substance addictions (Gold-
stein et al., 2007; Wrase et al., 2007). Conversely, human lesion
patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
showed increased wagering on a neuropsychological test of
gambling behavior (Clark et al., 2008). Activity in this region
has also been associated with decisions to chase one’s losses
(Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2008), which is widely recognized
as a hallmark of problem gambling. As well as the near-miss
effects discussed above, the presence of personal control
caused subjects to rate their chances of winning as higher,
and the winning outcomes as more pleasurable, compared to
computer-selected gambles, although we were unable to detect
any corollary of these effects in the fMRI experiment.
These data demonstrate that two cognitive distortions associ-
ated with gambling behavior can be elicited in a laboratory
setting, in healthy subjects who do not gamble with any regu-
larity. Gambling near-misses were associated with significant
recruitment of brain win-related circuitry and acted to increase
desire to gamble when the subject had personal control over se-
lecting the gamble. These neural responsesmay be described as
anomalous, in the sense that they occur in the absence of objec-
tive reinforcement on near-miss trials. In this sense, these find-
ings are congruent with data showing that striatal activity is
tied to the subjective utility rather than the objective value of
the outcome; for example, the ventral striatal response to mone-
tary wins is also sensitive to framing effects (Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2005a) and individual discount functions in the valuation of de-
layed rewards (Kable and Glimcher, 2007). These neural corre-
lates of the near-miss effect may underlie the behavioral potency
of near-miss outcomes to engender continued play. Our findings
in the ventral striatum and rACC are consistent with current
knowledge about the involvement of these regions in reward pro-
cessing and decision-making. The close relationships between
insula recruitment, and measures of gambling propensity and
the subjective effects of near-misses, indicate an important
role for the insula in decisions to gamble. By linking psycholog-
ical and neurobiological accounts of gambling behavior, thesedata inform our understanding of the allure of gambling behavior
within society, and by extrapolation, the capacity of gambling to
become addictive and pathological.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Experiment 1 (Behavioral Study)
Subjects
Forty undergraduate volunteers (23 male) were recruited through university
advertisements that asked ‘‘Do you enjoy gambling?’’ Subjects attended
a single test session, where they completed the slot machine task (30 min),
the South Oaks Gambling Screen (Lesieur and Blume, 1987) and the
gambling-related cognitions scale (Raylu and Oei, 2004; see Table S1). The
protocol was approved by the Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics
Committee (#2006.35) and all volunteers provided written informed consent.
Volunteers were instructed that they would have ‘‘the opportunity to win
money on the task’’ and by virtue of the pseudorandomized win sequence,
all participants received £5 at the end of the session.
Task Design
The task was programmed in Microsoft Visual Basic 6, with responses regis-
tered on three adjacent keyboard keys. Trial structure and display screen
are displayed in Figure 1. The task display resembles a two-reel slot machine,
with the same six icons displayed, in the same order, on the left and right reel,
and a horizontal ‘‘payline’’ across the center of the screen. At the start of the
task, the subject was invited to select the six icons they wished to play with,
from sixteen alternatives arranged in a 43 4 matrix. This feature was included
to enhance the participants’ level of involvement, and subjects were instructed
that the available shapes would vary in the chances of winning during the
game. After selecting their icons, the subject played 4 practice trials followed
by 60 trials with monetary reward available.
Each trial consisted of a selection phase, an anticipation phase, and an
outcome phase. The selection phase lasted a fixed 5 s duration, where one
shape on the left reel was selected. The anticipation phase lasted a variable
duration (2.8–6 s), where the right reel was spun, and decelerated to a stand-
still. The outcome phase was initiated as the right reel stopped moving: if the
right reel stopped on the icon that was selected on the left reel (i.e., matching
icons displayed in the payline), the subject was awarded £0.50; all other
outcomes won nothing. Outcomes were presented in a fully balanced pseudo-
random order to ensure a proportionate number of wins over the 60 trials (1/6,
total 10), near-misses (2/6, total 20) and full-misses (3/6, total 30). The outcome
phase lasted a fixed 4 s duration. At the end of each trial, there was an intertrial
interval of variable duration (2–7 s).
Two trial types were presented in a pseudorandom order: on 30 trials, the
play icon was selected by the participant, and on the other 30 trials, the play
icon was selected by the computer. Trial type was indicated by screen back-
ground color and a message on the left side of the screen. On participant-
chosen trials (white background), the subject chose the play icon using keys
1 and 2 to rotate the reel up and down, and key 3 to select the icon currently
displayed in the payline. On computer-chosen trials (black background), the
computer selected the icon on the left reel, but the subject was required to
confirm the selection by pressing key 3, in order to better equate attentional
and motor demands across the two conditions. In both conditions, if selec-
tion/confirmation was not completed within the 5 s window, a ‘‘Too late’’
message was displayed and the next trial commenced after the intertrial
interval.
On each trial, subjective ratings were also acquired using onscreen visual
analog scales. After the selection phase, subjects rated ‘‘How do you rate
your chances of winning?’’ and after the outcome phase, two further ratings
were taken: ‘‘How pleased are you with the result?’’ and ‘‘How much do you
want to continue to play the game?’’ Subjects indicated their response on
a 21 point scale using keys 1 and 2 to move left and right and key 3 to confirm.
No time limit was imposed for the subjective ratings.
Statistical Analysis
Subjective ratings for each subject were standardized to a z score, based on
the individual’s mean and standard deviation for that rating, given the vari-
ability in anchoring across subjects. Data were inspected for normality andNeuron 61, 481–490, February 12, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 487
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ratings were analyzed using paired t tests (for ‘‘chances of winning’’) and
repeated-measures analysis of variance (for ‘‘pleased with outcome’’
and ‘‘continue to play’’) with outcome (three levels: win, near-miss, full-miss)
and control (two levels: participant-chosen, computer-chosen) as factors.
The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied where sphericity was
violated. Two-tailed statistics were thresholded at p < 0.05.
Experiment 2 (fMRI Study)
Subjects
Seventeen right-handed subjects with no history of psychiatric or neurological
disorder were recruited from advertisements around the University. One
subject withdrew due to claustrophobia, and one subject was subsequently
excluded from all analysis due to excessive movement (4mmwithin session,
with pronounced spiking), leaving 15 subjects (9 male, mean age 26 SD 7.5) in
the reported analysis. Subjects reported minimal to modest involvement in
gambling, indexed by scores on the South Oaks Gambling Screen of 0–3
(mean 0.7, SD 1.0; scores R5 indicate probable pathological gambling).
Subjects attended a single fMRI session at the Wolfson Brain Imaging Centre
in Cambridge, UK. The protocol was approved by the Norfolk & Norwich
Research Ethics Committee (COREC 06/Q0101/69) and all volunteers
providedwritten informed consent. Volunteers were reimbursed £20 for partic-
ipation ‘‘with the opportunity to win further money on the task’’ (£15 over 180
trials).
Task Design
Several minor modifications were required for fMRI. First, the auditory feed-
back was not delivered given the noise of the scanner. Second, more trials
were acquired (3 blocks of 60 trials) to enable sufficient power for fMRI anal-
ysis. Third, the number of ratings was reduced given the longer task duration:
the ‘‘pleased with outcome’’ rating was dropped altogether, and the ratings of
‘‘chances of winning’’ and ‘‘continue to play’’ were acquired, at random, on 1 in
3 trials. Responseswere recorded using the first three buttons on a four-button
box, resting on the subject’s stomach under the dominant hand. Subjects per-
formed 10 practice trials on the task (delivering two hypothetical wins) before
entering the fMRI scanner.
Imaging Procedure
Scanning was performed on a Siemens TimTrio 3 Teslamagnet using a 32 slice
axial oblique sequence, with a repetition time of 2 s (TE 30ms, flip angle 78,
voxel size 3.1 3 3.1 3 3.0 mm, matrix size 64 3 64, field of view 201 mm 3
201 mm, bandwidth 2232 Hz/Px). At the start of each run, six dummy scans
were discarded to allow for equilibrium effects. Each 60 trial EPI run lasted
a maximum of 630 repetitions (21 min), but was terminated early on block
completion. A high-resolution T1-weighted three-dimensional magnetiza-
tion-prepared rapid acquisition gradient-echo sequence (MP-RAGE) struc-
tural image was also acquired for use in spatial normalization of the EPI series.
Imaging Analysis
fMRI data analysis was performed using SPM5 (Statistical Parametric
Mapping, Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). Data
preprocessing consisted of slice timing correction, within-subject realignment,
spatial normalization, and spatial smoothing using a 10 mm Gaussian kernel.
Time series were high pass filtered (128 s). Volumes were normalized to the
International Consortium for Brain Mapping (ICBM) templates that approxi-
mate to Talairach and Tournoux (1988) space, using a matrix obtained from
normalizing each subject’s segmented MP-RAGE structural scan onto the
ICBM gray and white matter templates.
A canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) was modeled to the
onsets of the selection phase, the anticipation phase and the outcome phase
on each trial. At the selection onset, two trial types were distinguished: partic-
ipant-chosen trials and computer-chosen trials. At anticipation and outcome,
eight trial types were distinguished, comprising a 2 (choice: participant-
chosen, computer-chosen) by 4 (win, near-miss before the payline, near-
miss past the payline, full-miss) factorial design. The design matrix thus
comprised 18 (2 + 8 + 8) columns per session. In addition, the movement
parameters from realignment were included as covariates of no interest. The
HRF was used a covariate in a general linear model, and a parameter estimate
was obtained for each voxel, for each event type, reflecting the strength of
covariance between the data and the canonical HRF. Contrast images were488 Neuron 61, 481–490, February 12, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.calculated between parameter estimates from different trial types. The
following outcome-related contrasts were computed:
(1) Win-related activity: Winning outcomes on participant- and computer-
chosen trials minus all nonwinning outcomes on participant- and
computer-chosen trials.
(2) Near-miss activity: near-miss outcomes on participant- and computer-
chosen trials minus full-miss outcomes on participant- and computer-
chosen trials. This contrast was restricted to areas showingwin-related
activity (i.e., masked with contrast 1).
(3) Near-miss by choice interaction: areas differentially recruited by near-
misses compared to full-misses as a factor of participant versus
computer control (i.e., 1, 1, 1, 1). This contrast was restricted to
areas showing win-related activity (i.e., masked with contrast 1).
(4) Win activity as a function of personal control: winning outcomes on
participant-chosen trials minus winning outcomes on computer-
chosen trials. This contrast was restricted to areas showingwin-related
activity (i.e., masked with contrast 1).
Based on the data from experiment 1, contrasts 2 and 3 were repeated
restricted to near-miss outcomes where the play icon passed through the pay-
line. Contrasts 1 and 2 were also calculated for the onset of the anticipation
phase. For the selection phase onsets, a single contrast of participant-chosen
minus computer-chosen trials was calculated (see Table S5). Individual
contrast images were taken to a second-level random-effects group analysis,
and were thresholded at p < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons using
random field theory (Worsley et al., 1996), i.e., familywise error corrected.
Masking of contrasts with the win-related activity (contrast 1) was performed
using the PickAtlas tool (Maldjian et al., 2003). Signal change was extracted
from activated foci using the MARSBAR tool (http://marsbar.sourceforge.
net/) for the purposes of plotting the data.
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA
The Supplemental Data include five tables and supplemental text and can be
found with this article online at http://www.neuron.org/supplemental/S0896-
6273(09)00037-3.
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